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Law, Culture, and Cultural
Appropriation
Sally Engle Merry*
Anthropological research on law since the early twentieth century
has provided critically important perspectives on the way law is
embedded in the social life of distinctive cultural groups. Yet over the
last decade, the concept of culture on which many of these insights
depend has come under siege. The nature of culture has been
radically retheorized. This change demands an equivalent rethinking
of the relationship between law and cultural phenomena. Using an
example of legal transformation in the nineteenth-century Pacific, this
Essay suggests an approach to analyzing relationships between law
and culture that relies on a more complex, contested, and historically
located understanding of culture. It examines the process of legal
appropriation in the context of competing cultural logics and the
expansion of European capitalism and imperialism into social worlds
governed by other systems of exchange and power.
Between 1825 and 1850, the sovereign Kingdom of Hawai'i adopted
a system of Anglo-American law, courts, and prisons to replace the
Hawaiian system of kapu (tabu) and chiefship. The adoption was
incremental: Small steps initiated broader, frequently unanticipated
changes, shifting the landscape in ways that precipitated taking further
steps. The transformation took place within a cultural field defined in
part by European conceptions of sovereignty and of racial and
religious difference. The reigning Hawaiian chiefs deliberately
appropriated Anglo-American law in order to "civilize" their country
and assert sovereignty in European terms. This was not an act of
imposition, although the chiefs acted in a situation of considerable
pressure and constraint. They did not simply accept the new system
but resisted some of its features and redefined aspects of it according
to their own categories and systems of meaning.1 Instead of seeing
* Class of 1949 Professor in Ethics and Professor of Anthropology, Wellesley College.
1. See generally THE IMPOSMON OF LAW (Sandra Burman & Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds.,
1979) (illustrating that this is a common reaction to the imposition of a new legal system).
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this situation as an instance of acculturation, a smooth blending of
two "cultures" and their embedded legal systems, it should be
understood as appropriation and resistance taking place on a field of
contested cultural meanings and power relations. Examining cases of
legal appropriation and the kinds of cultural meanings and social
transformations that result provides a more dynamic and agentive way
of understanding the linkage between law and culture.
Many of the important early anthropological insights about law
built on a concept of culture as integrated, stable, consensual,
bounded, and distinctive. Culture was defined as the common values,
institutions, and regular social interactions shared by a group of
people. Many theorists attributed change to evolutionary processes
rather than historical events or individual action. Anthropological
research from the 1920s to the 1950s demonstrated that law was a
fundamental part of the normative system of any society and served
to maintain its social order.2 Systems of rules were organically
connected to distinctive social structures. Nonstate mechanisms such
as informal moots and councils, reciprocity, ostracism, gossip,
witchcraft accusations, and other forms of subtle social pressure
produced social order.3 At moments of trouble, the law became
visible and articulated, but afterward returned to equilibrium.4 In the
1970s and 1980s, developing this tradition in conjunction with
interpretive anthropology, Clifford Geertz and Lawrence Rosen
developed a sophisticated analysis of the cultural embeddedness of
law understood as a system of meaning.5 Geertz described law as a
way of imagining the real, foregrounding its role in constituting
culture as a system of meaning.6 Rosen explored law as a symbolic
and cultural system that simultaneously constructs the order of the
larger society and is suffused by that order. "[T]he analysis of legal
systems, like the analysis of social systems, requires at its base an
understanding of the categories of meaning by which participants
2. See, e.g., E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954); BRONISLAW
MALINOWSKI, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN A SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
3. See, e.g., MALINOWSKI, supra note 2; Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal,
in 1 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 271 (Donald Black ed., 1984).
4. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN & E.A. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941) (suggesting
that incidents of trouble or hitch and the responses that these cases evoke are the best way to
understand law).
5. For Geertz's work most relevant to the study of law, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local
Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER
ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983) [hereinafter GEERTZ, Local Knowledge]. For
the clearest exposition of the interpretive approach, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973). Lawrence Rosen has developed this approach with fine-
grained studies of the cultural and linguistic aspects of law in Moroccan communities. See
LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AND CULTURE IN ISLAMIC
SOCIETY (1989).
6. See GEERTZ, Local Knowledge, supra note 5.
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themselves comprehend their experience and orient themselves
toward one another in their everyday lives."7 The legal realm is a
part of the entire social fabric, and its concepts, its power, and its
struggles extend across the disparate domains of social life.8
Challenges to understanding law through this concept of culture
came through the study of disputing processes, which provided a more
agentive, dynamic understanding of the relationship between culture
and law but did not necessarily challenge the notion of culture as
integrated and bounded.9 The management of disputes was the
product of the set of social relationships within which they occurred,
so that the choice of adjudicative rather than conciliatory approaches
depended on the web of relationships among the parties.I° Sally E
Moore's emphasis on law as process incorporated history into the
analysis and focused on how rules were created, maintained, and
enforced in everyday interactions, thus historicizing the concept of
culture." In the 1980s, June Starr and Jane Collier emphasized
power relationships and historical change, 2 and in the 1990s, Susan
Hirsch and Mindie Lazarus-Black focused on hegemony and
resistance in the analysis of legal phenomena. 3
Over the last two decades, the meaning of culture has come under
intense scrutiny within anthropology. Instead of a reified notion of a
fixed and stable set of beliefs, values, and institutions, culture is being
redefined as a flexible repertoire of practices and discourses created
through historical processes of contestation over signs and
meanings.'4 Cultural forms and practices are locally expressed but
connected to global systems of economic exchange, power relations,
and systems of meaning. 5 They are constructed and transformed
over historical time through the activities of individuals as well as
7. ROSEN, supra note 5, at xiv.
8. See id. at 5. For example, the qadi, a local Islamic judge, long regarded by Western
scholars as exercising enormous discretion, follows consistent principles drawn from everyday
life. The qadi Rosen describes shares the cultural logic of the small Moroccan town where he
works. As he determines the facts of the case and reasons from these facts to a decision, he
builds on shared cultural concepts of knowledge and right, of human nature, of the public
interest, and of the ways states of mind are attributed to actors.
9. See, e.g., THE DISPUTIVE PROCESS (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd eds., 1978).
10. See, e.g., MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF
NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955).
11. See SALLY F. MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS (1978); SALLY F. MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND
FABRICATIONS: CUSTOMARY LAW ON KILIMANJARO, 1880-1980 (1986).
12. See HISTORY AND POWER: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF LAW (June Starr & Jane
Collier eds., 1989).
13. See CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY, AND RESISTANCE (Mindie Lazarus-Black
& Susan Hirsch eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTESTED STATES].
14. See, e.g., JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1988); JOHN COMAROFF
& JEAN COMAROFF, FROM REVELATION TO REVOLUTION (1991); GEORGE MARCUS &
MICHAEL FISHER, WRITING CULTURE (1986).
15. See ERIC WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY (1982).
19981
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through larger social processes. Transformation occurs through
particular historical events rather than through gradual social
evolution. Thus, culture is continuously produced and reproduced at
particular historical times in specific places situated within global
movements of people and capital.
Moreover, culture is integral to systems of power. Cultural forms
construct hegemonic understandings as well as the counterhegemonies
that challenge these understandings. 6 Since the maintenance of
relations of power depends on retaining particular cultural meanings,
moments of resistance include redefinitions of cultural meanings, as
well as more direct forms of resistance such as noncooperation,
sabotage, foot-dragging, petty thievery, and refusal to conform to
gender or class expectations.
17
This redefined concept of culture has significant implications for
theoretical understandings of the linkage between law and culture.
The notion of an organic embeddedness describes some but not all
social situations. Law's systems of meanings are not necessarily
identical to those of the culture within which they operate, nor are
their consequences only to maintain order. Law is a cultural system
that can be imposed on other cultural systems. Consequently, the
relationship between law and culture becomes deeply problematic in
situations involving legal transplants, when law is appropriated from
one society to another or imposed by one society on another through
colonialism or conquest. 8
In my study of Hawai'i, I found that the Hawaiian Islands during
the nineteenth century were not the site of an isolated cultural system
but lay at the crossroads of a dizzying array of peoples engaged in the
expansion of capitalism and European imperial power. After Cook's
initial "discovery" of the islands in 1778, the islands were visited by
merchants from Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United
States; goods were traded in Spanish dollars brought from Chile and
Peru; and Chinese merchants and sugar masters settled in Honolulu
to trade or moved into the wet valleys to grow rice or sugar. The New
16. See COMAROFF & COMAROFF, supra note 14; JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF,
ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992) [hereinafter COMAROFF &
COMAROFF, ETHNOGRAPHY].
17. See JAMES C. SCOaT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN
TRANSCRIPTS (1990) [hereinafter SCOTr, DOMINATION]; JAMES C. SCOT, WEAPONS OF THE
WEAK (1985) [hereinafter Sco'rr, WEAPONS]; Lila Abu-Lughod, The Romance of Resistance:
Tracing Transformations of Power Through Bedouin Women, 17 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 41 (1990);
Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal
Consciousness, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992); Sally E. Merry, Resistance and the Cultural
Power of Law, 29 L. & SOC'Y REV. 11 (1995); Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over": Power,
Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
18. See M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM (1975).
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England missionaries arriving from upstate New York, western
Massachusetts, and western Connecticut in 1820 came from com-
munities more isolated than many in Hawai'i at the time. Nor were
these islands culturally cohesive or integrated. Hawai'i in the 1830s
and 1840s was a social field buffeted by competing cultural logics
rooted in particular structures of power, a situation typical of colonial
contexts. The distinctive cultural worlds of Hawaiian ali'i (chiefs) and
maka'ainana (commoners), British and American whaleship owners
and crews, European sugar planters, Chinese sugar masters and rice
farmers, Spanish and Peruvian merchants, American Protestant
missionaries, Russian fur traders, French Catholic priests, resident
American and British merchants, deserting and abandoned seamen
from New England and the South Pacific, and roving fortune seekers
from around the globe jostled together in a rapidly evolving social
situation. After midcentury, the importation of large numbers of sugar
plantation workers from China, Portugal, Japan, Korea, Puerto Rico,
the Philippines, and the South Pacific further complicated the variety
of cultural logics at play within local social situations. Under such
conditions, the concept of a homogeneous, cohesive cultural system
within which a unitary system of law is embedded seems grossly
inadequate.
Part I of this Essay explores the changing meanings of culture
within anthropological theory. Part II illustrates the strengths of a new
conception of culture for understanding the legal transition in
nineteenth-century Hawai'i. This is a dramatic instance of legal
appropriation, yet legal transplants of this kind are widespread in
colonial history and in the contemporary postcolonial world. Part III
considers how legal appropriation constitutes a form of resistance.
I. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CULTURE
Constructing a definition for anthropology's core concept has
always been difficult, but at no time more so than the present. Culture
is everywhere a topic of concern and analysis from cultural studies to
literature to all the social sciences. Classic conceptions of bounded,
coherent, stable, and integrated systems are clearly inadequate.
Culture is now a deeply contested term; part of many discourses, from
cultural studies to multiculturalism, are doing work on the concept,
suggesting both its significance and its elusiveness as a category of
analysis. Although the difficulties posed by the concept of culture in
the analysis of cultural change have been widely discussed, it is less
clear what concept can replace the totalizing, coherent, normative idea
of culture that developed as part of the natural-history approach to
studying and describing cultural difference.
1998]
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A. Nineteenth-Century Sources of the Concept of Culture
Historically, culture as an analytic concept in anthropology
developed to describe a world in which Europeans understood there
to be civilized people and "primitives" who lived unchanging and
utterly different, although internally coherent, lives. These
"primitives" had to be tolerated, not because they conformed to the
values of the observer but because they were, in a sense, off the edge
of her moral universe.19 But in the last two decades, world system
theory has criticized the model of society as an isolated "billiard ball"
within global economic and cultural processes," while the analysis of
globalization, the expansion of cultural studies, and the emphasis on
discourse and power in Foucauldian work have all challenged
understandings of culture as based on shared norms and values and
bounded or homogeneous social groups. Culture is now understood
as historically produced rather than static; unbounded rather than
bounded and integrated; contested rather than consensual; incor-
porated within structures of power such as the construction of
hegemony; rooted in practices, symbols, habits, patterns of practical
mastery, and practical rationality within cultural categories of meaning
rather than in any simple dichotomy between ideas and behavior; and
negotiated and constructed through human action rather than
superorganic forces.
This list of characteristics suggests that the earlier idea of culture
was never suitable for understanding an interconnected and historical-
ly changing social world. The concept was largely a nineteenth-century
construct. There were at least two sources of this concept of culture
within the field of anthropology in the last century. One was a
natural-history approach to knowledge, developed during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as part of the planetary (global)
consciousness of European society."' In this period, naturalists and
explorers journeyed out of Europe and engaged in a discovery process
that, although understood as innocently disconnected from power,
produced bodies of knowledge that classified and charted the animals,
plants, and, ultimately, peoples of the world into categories. Isolated
cultural groups were seen as analogous to isolated and primitive
plants and animals, located at earlier stages in the evolutionary
process. King Leopold II's museum of Africa in Brussels, built in
19. See JOAN VINCENT, ANTHROPOLOGY AND POLITICS: VISIONS, TRADITIONS, AND
TRENDS (1990).
20. WOLF, supra note 15, at 17.
21. See MARY LOUISE PRATT, IMPERIAL EYES: TRAVEL WRITING AND TRANSCUL-
TURATION (1992).
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1898, is a prime exemplar of this approach to knowing cultural
"others." In an ornate Victorian building, exhibits of tools, weapons,
houses, and spirit ancestors from African peoples are juxtaposed with
stuffed animals, insects on pins, and mineral exhibits from Central
Africa. The museum displays the range of species of animals, plants,
rocks, and "cultures" populating the "other" world.
A second source for definitions of culture used by early
anthropologists was the Germanic notion of Kultur. As Norbert Elias
notes, the concept of Kultur was juxtaposed with Zivilisation in
nineteenth-century German thought.22 Civilization referred to the
manners and practices shared across national boundaries that joined
the French, the British, and other "civilized" peoples in a global
society. Kultur, on the other hand, emphasized difference: It was the
category through which the German bourgeoisie claimed a distinctive
peoplehood through their own manners and customs. They celebrated
German Kultur, he argues, because they were excluded from
European civilization by the marginality of their aristocracy. Kultur
was, in fact, the way that the bourgeoisie emphasized to themselves
that they were better than the aristocrats of other nations. They
celebrated their own values and work ethic rather than aping the
manners of "civilization." Thus Kultur became a way of claiming
separateness and superiority in the face of a globalizing aristocracy of
learning, language, and custom.
It is understandable that nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
anthropologists, searching for a language to celebrate the divergent
yet legitimate ways of life of those generally labeled savages, would
turn to the concept of Kultur, an idea already in use, to emphasize
difference and legitimacy in opposition to a globalizing civilization.
Just as the Germans had Kultur, so did the Nuer and the Tallensi.
Boundedness and coherence were therefore fundamental political
features of this concept, along with a militant assertion of
separateness and superiority. Emphasizing the authenticity and
coherence of distinct cultures was a way anthropologists could resist
the civilizing mission fundamental to the European colonial project.
But the concept that served so well in the context of nineteenth- and
early-twentieth-century imperialism now carries with it far different
implications. It fixes and separates just at a time when scholars have
come to see national, cultural, and ethnic boundaries as fluid and
identities as hybrid. The important theoretical problems arise from the
analysis of contact zones, colonial projects, and borderlands rather
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than "societies" or "cultures." The combined impact of technology,
tourism, global capitalism, deterritorialized communities, and
migration are blurring and redrawing cultural boundaries at a rapid
rate.
B. Recent Theories of the Concept of Culture
Other models of culture provide richer possibilities for thinking
about the relationship between law and culture under conditions of
cultural contact, hybridity, and globalization. Comaroff and Comaroff
take culture to be "the semantic space, the field of signs and practices,
in which human beings construct and represent themselves and others,
and hence their societies and histories. It is not merely an abstract
order of signs, or relations among signs. Nor is it just the sum of
habitual practices."23 Culture is never a closed, entirely coherent
system but contains within it polyvalent, contestable messages, images,
and actions.
It is, in short, a historically situated, historically unfolding
ensemble of signifiers-in-action, signifiers at once material and
symbolic, social and aesthetic. Some of these, at any moment in
time, will be woven into more or less tightly integrated, relatively
explicit worldviews; others may be heavily contested, the stuff of
counterideologies and "subcultures"; yet others may become
more or less unfixed, relatively free floating, and indeterminate
in their value and meaning.24
This is a concept of culture that allows for agency and contest in
situations with multiple and contradictory cultural logics and systems
of meaning.
Mary Louise Pratt describes fields of interaction between competing
cultural logics as contact zones: "social spaces where disparate cultures
meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical
relations of domination and subordination-like colonialism, slavery,
or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today."25
Unlike the term "frontier," which privileges a center and an edge, the
term "contact zone" focuses on intersections among equally centered
entities. Pratt suggests the term "transculturation" to describe how
subjugated peoples receive and appropriate metropolitan modes of
representation. She explains how peripheral groups constitute the
metropolis, creating its need continually to create and recreate itself
in opposition to those peripheries.26
23. COMAROFF & COMAROFF, ETHNOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 27.
24. Id.
25. PRATT, supra note 21, at 4.
26. Id. at 6.
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Nicholas Thomas advocates the study of "colonial projects" rather
than a totality such as a culture or a period that can be defined
independently of a people's perceptions and strategies. A colonial
project is "a socially transformative endeavor that is localized,
politicized and partial, yet also engendered by longer historical
developments and ways of narrating them."27 It is a deterritorialized
social system: "Colonial projects are construed, misconstrued, adapted
and enacted by actors whose subjectivities are fractured-half here,
half there, sometimes disloyal, sometimes almost 'on the side' of the
people they patronize and dominate, and against the interests of some
metropolitan office."28 To examine a colonial project is to look at the
process itself and to attend to its agents, both its proponents and
detractors, and to analyze the hybrid cultural practices and people
that are its consequence. This notion of the partial, transposed, or
truncated character of groups in the colonial social field highlights the
contest and negotiation of meanings over time rather than consensus
or shared values. As an anthropological concept, "project" emphasizes
orientations toward transformation and innovation, frequently a
characteristic of colonial situations. Settlers often seek to change while
the colonized often seek to return to former circumstances, itself a
transformative project.
Thus, these conceptions move us away from seeing cultures as
homogeneous entities, toward imagining them as arenas of contest
among competing cultural logics in which variously situated actors
seize and appropriate cultural practices. The location of culture is no
longer a fixed geographical space, but rather it is constituted in
multiple places reflecting the movement of peoples, capital, and
symbolic systems. Many of the struggles in the colonies to transform
the social order, to expand the knowability and visibility of the
population, and to implement the disciplinary systems of the modern
state paralleled similar efforts to refashion the rural peasantry and the
urban poor at home. In Hawai'i, for example, New England mis-
sionaries attempted to control the sex trade between seamen on
merchant and whale ships and the Hawaiian maka'ainana women
during the 1820s and 1830s. This project was linked to similar
struggles in the northeastern United States but took on a new valence
in the Hawaiian context. The interaction partook of the cultural and
ethnic features of the colonial encounter: Women of color were
appropriated by visiting white men while missionaries resisted this
appropriation in order to protect their charges. At the same time,
27. NICHOLAS THOMAS, COLONIALISM'S CULTURE: ANTHROPOLOGY, TRAVEL AND
GOVERNMENT 105 (1994).
28. Id. at 60.
19981
9
Merry: Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 575
missionary intervention also reflected the class and religious dimen-
sions of the New Englanders' concern with the moral character of
lower-class sailors. The dimensions of Christian virtue and class
difference marked out these seamen as sites for reformist projects in
both locations.
Marxist-oriented anthropologists tend to highlight social class rather
than culture and to avoid fixed concepts of culture. The concept of
class in the Marxist tradition is relational, processual, and specific so
that any particular social class can only be defined in relation to other
social classes, forces of production, and property relations that create
and transfer surpluses. Gerald Sider, in his study of the shifting
political economy and changing cultural forms of Newfoundland over
a long historical period, shows that cultural forms change in response
to shifts in political economy and that culture as a set of symbolic
meanings is derivative of political and economic processes." Culture
appears to be independent because it is an abstract and all-inclusive
concept. Yet, culture is part of the larger process, not a static
abstraction or an epiphenomenon of other, more fundamental
changes.3"
One of the more cogent recent critiques of the concept of culture
is an argument that in the process of generalizing from the par-
ticularities of person and event, anthropologists reify culture and
construct an "otherness" by imagining the totality and integration of
a culture and the discrete and bounded nature of cultures in relation-
ship to one another.3 Lila Abu-Lughod argues that despite the
intention to account for and understand cultural difference,
anthropology ends up creating difference and making it seem self-
evident. She suggests "writing against culture" as a method of
resisting generalizations. Abu-Lughod proposes that anthropologists
tell stories rather than construct models of institutions, rules, and ways
of doing things, and that they describe particular people and the way
they marry and live rather than attach a marriage practice to a culture
as a whole.32 Roger Lancaster employs a similar approach in his
ethnography of Nicaragua, resisting generalizations that efface
particular people, actions, and stories.33
Ironically, just as the older concept of culture seems less ap-
propriate for contemporary society, it is being vigorously reap-
propriated by indigenous peoples and a plethora of ethnonational
29. See GERALD M. SIDER, CULTURE AND CLASS IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1986).
30. See id. at 6.
31. See LILA ABU-LUGHOD, WRITING WOMEN'S WORLDS: BEDOUIN STORIES 12 (1993).
32. See id. at 13.
33. See ROGER N. LANCASTER, LIFE IS HARD: MACHISMO, DANGER AND THE INTIMACY
OF POWER IN NICARAGUA (1992).
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groups in search of sovereignty and self-determination in this new
cultural world.34 Native American groups and groups such as the
Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement make claims on the basis of their
"traditional" cultures, joining an interest in cultural renaissance with
the political constraints of a society that is willing to recognize claims
on the basis of cultural authenticity and tradition but not demands for
reparations based on acts of conquest and violation in the past. In
her discussion of the concept of culture as it is used in the politics of
indigenousness in Colombia, Jean Jackson notes that the tendency to
essentialize culture within anthropology has been adopted by Indian
movements in Colombia, as well as by other indigenous societies, to
make claims in the modern world.36 The concept the indigenous
people appropriate is based on a quasi-biological analogy by which a
group of people "has" a culture in the way that a group of cats have
fur, inherited as genes are inherited. Instead, culture can be seen as
something they create and improvise to adapt to changing social
conditions and situations.
37
C. Cultural Production and Appropriation
All of these newer understandings of culture emphasize the
agentive aspects of culture and its interactive co-construction over
time. Concepts such as cultural production and cultural appropriation
provide for agency and power in historically constituted spaces.
Cultural production incorporates notions of production and culture,
since this form of production draws on "a stock of already existing
cultural elements drawn from the reservoirs of lived culture or from
the already public fields of discourse., 38 Cultural appropriation
means adopting a cultural product in terms of local meanings and
practices. In its broadest sense the term means taking an existing
cultural form from one social group and replaying it in another with
different meanings or practices: perhaps taking the tune and playing
it in a different key or at a different tempo so that it becomes
something different, yet still the same.
The concept of cultural appropriation has been developed in the
field of intellectual property to refer to processes by which dominant
34. See John L. Comaroff, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Difference in the Age
of Revolution, in PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONALISM AND WAR 243 (John L. Comaroff & Paul C.
Stern eds., 1995).
35. See WARD CHURCHILL, FROM A NATIVE SON (1996).
36. See Jean Jackson, Culture, Genuine and Spurious: The Politics of Indianness in the
Vaupes, Colombia, 22 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 3 (1995).
37. See id. at 18. Jackson notes that anthropologists tend to view "pure" cultures as more
prestigious than less remote or isolated cultures, conferring differing levels of prestige on those
who study these cultures as well.
38. Richard Johnson, What is Cultural Studies Anyway?, 6 SOCIAL TEXT 38 (1986/87).
1998]
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groups take, and often profit from, the artistic, musical, and
knowledge productions of subordinate groups. A recent collection
from the intellectual property perspective uses a resolution of the
Writer's Union of Canada from June 1992 and broadly defines
cultural appropriation as "the taking-from a culture that is not one's
own-of intellectual property, cultural expressions or artifacts, history
and ways of knowledge."39 This definition focuses on takings that
produce profits for the taker. However, cultural appropriation
encompasses a very broad and pervasive phenomenon as cultural
influences blend and merge in constantly layered ways.' Although
cultural appropriation in this framework is viewed as a taking by a
dominant group from a subordinate group, it can be done the other
way as well. But power relations are fundamental to the concept of
cultural appropriation as it is used in this field. A problem with this
notion of cultural appropriation is that it still relies on the problematic
notion of culture as a bounded and integrated system of meanings.
The game of Trobriand cricket, captured in a well-known eth-
nographic film,4" provides a dramatic illustration of such subversive
appropriation. The Trobrianders adopted the game of cricket from
British missionaries, who had hoped the game would "civilize" the
Trobrianders and replace tribal fighting. Instead, the Trobrianders
redefined cricket as an occasion for competitive chanting, gift-giving,
and performance in which the host team and village must always
emerge victorious. In a similar process of appropriation, the leaders
of the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement staged a tribunal in 1993
commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of the American-
backed coup against the Hawaiian Queen Lili'uokalani. The tribunal
accused the United States of a series of acts of destruction of culture
and appropriation of land and sovereignty using the form of a
criminal trial. The seat labeled "U.S. Representative" was glaringly
vacant as witnesses testified about the overthrow and their cultural
and economic losses to a panel of judges, eminent activists, and
human rights lawyers from around the world. The organizing
committee issued a formal complaint before the tribunal, accusing the
United States of violating a series of national and international laws.
Thus this tribunal appropriated the form of United States law and its
language in a complaint against that same government.42
39. Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao, Introduction to Cultural Appropriation: A Framework for
Analysis, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION 1, 1 (Bruce Ziff &
Pratima Z. Rao eds., 1997).
40. See id. at 1-8.
41. See TROBRIAND CRICKET: AN INGENIOUS RESPONSE TO COLONIALISM (Government
of Papua-New Guinea 1975).
42. See Sally Engle Merry, Sexuality, Sovereignty, and the Civilizing Process: Law and the
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The important questions about culture are, therefore, how cultural
logics and practices are introduced, appropriated, deployed,
reintroduced, and redefined in a social field of power over an
historical stretch of time. Through historical processes, particular
cultural logics become embedded in politically and economically
powerful institutions such as legal systems. Focusing on production
and appropriation provides a framework that recognizes the agency
of subordinated peoples at the same time as it emphasizes the political
and economic constraints on that agency. It replaces ideas of
imposition with an analysis of the negotiated and partial nature of
transformation. Those introducing new forms, meanings, and practices
are continually confronted by frustration and failure, and with the
inability to impose a new system in whole cloth rather than in shreds,
as those who take it on and carry it out constantly redefine its forms
and practices in terms of other meanings and practices. As agents of
dominant groups struggle with the recalcitrance and reinterpretation
of customs by the subordinate, which Rudyard Kipling described so
eloquently in The White Man's Burden,43 their own consciousness
and cultural repertoire is redefined.
The Hawaiian ali'i and mo'i appropriated a largely New England-
derived legal system in the nineteenth century.' The Hawaiians
invited the American missionaries living on the islands to help them
craft a new system of laws and government. As the challenges to
Hawaiian sovereignty increased, the ali'i hired more foreigners to
design a constitution, a bill of rights, and a set of law codes based on
models drawn from New England and other parts of the world.
Rather than labeling this behavior collusion, I think it is important to
examine how various actors in particular historical situations
endeavored to maneuver in uncertain and changing political,
economic, and cultural environments. I argue that the ali'i and mo'i
adopted a Western legal system in order to appear "civilized" and
thereby enhance their claims to sovereignty at a time when imperial
powers were dividing up the Pacific, and resident European and
American Colonization of Hawaii (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
43. See RUDYARD KIPLING, The White Man's Burden, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE:
INCLUSIVE EDITION, 1885-1918, at 371 (1919). This poem was written just after the signing of
the Treaty of Paris (Dec. 10, 1898), the peace treaty between the United States and Spain that
ended the Spanish-American War. The treaty enabled the U.S. takeover of Cuba, the
Philippines, and Puerto Rico. See RALPH DURAND, A HANDBOOK TO THE POETRY OF
RUDYARD KIPLING 229 (1914). According to a 1914 commentary, "Both on selfish and unselfish
grounds, it was imperative that, in spite of her Constitution, the United States should 'take up
the White man's burden' of imperial responsibility and charge herself with the care of the semi-
civilized islands that she had wrested from Spain." Id. This date is highly relevant to the
situation in Hawai'i as well since it was shortly after this war that the United States agreed to
annex the islands.
44. See Merry, supra note 42.
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American merchants were demanding to be governed only by their
own national laws. At the same time, the New England missionaries
appropriated Hawaiians as benighted savages to whom they could
bring light.
The introduction of new legal systems into societies with existing
legal systems is widespread and poses important theoretical problems.
Sometimes called legal transplantation or the imposition of law, it
accompanied nineteenth-century colonialism, radically reshaping and
pluralizing the law of much of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.45
Colonial officials typically endeavored to eliminate customs they
considered repugnant, such as polygamy, witchcraft, payback killings,
suttee, ritual gift-giving ceremonials such as the potlatch, and many
other kinds of practices defined as "savage" or "uncivilized. ,46 More
subtly, the law was also mobilized to control and restrain behaviors
attributed to inherent flaws of character such as laziness or licentious-
ness.
Legal transplantation also occurs widely when nations borrow or
appropriate parts of the legal system of other societies. Ataturk's
adoption of the Swiss civil code in 1926 is one dramatic example,
47
but similar processes are now taking place in Eastern Europe, in
Western Europe with the introduction of American concepts of
leasing and franchising, and in many other parts of the world.
Similarly, American alternative dispute resolution techniques have
been introduced into many Asian countries in the last two decades.4
The Bhopal disaster in India in 1984 sparked a massive introduction
of American tort law into India.49 American law, legal practices, and
lawyers are fundamental to the legal system of the Federated States
of Micronesia." These are only a few examples of a widespread
pattern of legal transplantation in the contemporary world.
II. LEGAL APPROPRIATION IN THE KINGDOM
OF HAWAI'I, 1820-1850
The transplantation of American law to the Kingdom of Hawai'i
occurred by and large between 1820 and 1850. This was a time of
45. See, e.g., HOOKER, supra note 18.
46. See, e.g., PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992); Partha
Chatterjee, Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonized Women: The Contest in India, 16 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 622 (1989).
47. See, e.g., HOOKER, supra note 18, at 362-72.
48. See THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993).
49. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3
(1986).
50. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, UNDERSTANDING LAW IN MICRONESIA: AN
INTERPRETIVE APPROACH (1993).
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/16
Merry
massive economic and social change in Hawai'i as the subsistence
economy of fishing and taro farming under the supervision of a
hierarchy of chiefs gave way to several decades dominated by
mercantile exchange with fur traders, sandalwood merchants, and
whalers. By the end of the nineteenth century, the islands were
characterized by an industrial plantation economy based on sugar
production. During the period from Captain Cook's arrival in 1778
until the coup against Queen Lili'uokalani in 1893, the Hawaiian
population suffered a catastrophic decline, from an initial population
of as many as 800,000 people to 40,000 a century later.5' By the
1880s, the Native Hawaiian people were a minority in their own land,
surrounded by a burgeoning population of imported sugar workers
from Asia and Europe. Annexation to the United States in 1898 was
followed by a sixty-year period of colonialism and, in 1959, admission
to statehood. In some ways, this ended the colonial status of the
islands, but many of the relations of American/Hawaiian colonialism
and the racially stratified plantation economy remain.
The appropriation of American law by the ali'i in the early
nineteenth century is a complex historical story, but it can be
understood in terms of two major transitions: first from Hawaiian law
to a theocratic Hawaiian and Christian law, and second to a secular
law based on American models. In each transition, apparent
similarities as well as geopolitical concerns induced adoption, yet
differences emerged that sent the social transformation onto new and
often unanticipated trajectories. Each new form brought with it the
need for experts to run the new system, experts who were increasingly
beyond the control of the ali'i and engaged in running the system
according to the practices of New England, where most of the experts
originated.
A. The First Transition
In the first transition, from 1825 to 1843, the ali'i converted to
Christianity and soon began to adopt Christian law as the law of the
land. The New England missionaries translated the Ten Com-
mandments into the Hawaiian language and suggested their adoption
to the ali'i in the 1820s.12 By 1827, the ali'i had passed the first
printed laws outlawing murder, theft, and adultery.
The idea of a system of law descended from the authority of the
deities and enacted through their earthly representatives, the ali'i nui
51. See DAVID STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF HAWAI'I ON THE
EVE OF WESTERN CONTACT 45 (1989).
52. See, e.g., HIRAM BINGHAM, A RESIDENCE OF TWENTY-ONE-YEARS ON THE SANDWICH
ISLANDS (Rutland, Vt., C.E. Tuttle Co. 1981) (1847).
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(high chiefs), made sense to the ali'i as it did to the Protestant
Christians. Pre-1820 Hawaiian legality was inextricably joined to the
institutions of chiefship and religion, with conceptions of mana (the
spiritual power from Akua or deities), and with the link between the
ali'i nui and the Akua. Religion functioned to maintain the concept
of chiefly authority-not merely the rule of a particular dynasty, but
political authority in general. 53 The chiefly and priestly kapus (the
sacred, consecrated, and prohibited) served to protect and enhance
the spiritual/religious power of the chiefs, much as the eating kapu
protected masculine power.54 They maintained the elaborate system
of distinctions in rank and dramatically and severely punished those
who violated the system.55 Commoner men were put to death for
violating kapus of chiefly women, while chiefly women were generally
impervious to punishment for infractions of kapu.56 In the highest
ranks, adultery was punished by death, 7 but punishment of this
severity was restricted to sanctioning violations of the first marriages
of high-ranking women. The system of law regulating relations
between ali'i (chiefs) and maka'ainana (commoners, people of the
land) defined the prerogatives and power of chiefship. The focus was
not on the correction of everyday offenses, but rather on the dramatic
and vivid display of the awesome power of the ali'i and the reinforce-
ment of hierarchy and rank. This was a symbolic economy of
punishment; the severe rules tinged with mercy dramatized the power
and majesty of the ali'i and marked them as different.
Thus the political system of the ali'i envisioned political power as
inextricably linked to religious power. The right to rule descended
from the Akua (the deities), and ruling power was retained only as
long as the chief remained pono (in a state of righteousness).58 The
rapid decline in the population suggested to the ali'i that they were
not pono, or righteous. The new Christian religion offered eternal life
and righteousness as well as access to a new source of power,
including the ability to record and transmit thoughts through writing.
It was clear to the ali'i that the old deities were failing: The people
53. See JOCELYN LINNEKIN, SACRED QUEENS AND WOMEN OF CONSEQUENCE: RANK,
GENDER, AND COLONIALISM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 35 (1990).
54. The eating kapu restricted men to eating only with other men in order to protect their
sacredness and divided foods between those appropriate for women and those only for men. It
was fundamental to Hawaiian religion before 1819, when this kapu was broken by the mo'i
Liholiho.
55. See WILLIAM ELLIS, POLYNESIAN RESEARCHES: HAWAII (Rutland, Vt., Charles E.
Tuttle Co. 1969) (1828).
56. See LINNEKIN, supra note 53, at 35.
57. See ELLIS, supra note 55, at 421.
58. See LILIKALA KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES 48 (1992).
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were dying out, the land was no longer pono.59 They understood the
duty of the ali'i to malama, or care for the people and the land, as a
spiritual one. If the king were devout, his government would last.6"
It was, probably, in the hope that the new priests were powerful
enough to make things right that the ali'i converted to Christianity.
To the ali'i, the missionaries spoke for a new and powerful god,
Jehovah. It was common practice for a chief or king to take a new
god from the pantheon of thousands of deities as his personal god, to
build temples to him and make offerings in the hope of support in his
endeavors. Kamehameha, the mo'i (king) who first unified the islands
at the end of the eighteenth century, chose Ku as his personal deity
and was favored by Ku in his military and political exploits. This was
an instance of 'imi haku, searching for a leader or deity. Conversion
to Christianity was, then, consonant with existing politico-religious
practices.61
In 1825 Ka'ahumanu, the powerful regent, became one of the early
converts to the strict Calvinist version of Protestant Christianity
brought by the missionaries from New England. Soon after her
conversion, the missionaries urged the ali'i and mo'i to pass laws
based on the Ten Commandments, some of which did become law.
These new laws came from God as interpreted by the ali'i or by
Protestant missionaries, just as laws did in the Hawaiian politico-
religious system. As Marshall Sahlins and Patrick Kirch point out, the
missionaries offered the ali'i connected with Ka'ahumanu an alternate
legitimation of their rule that was consistent with the political
functions that had always been performed by the priesthood.62 When
the converted Christian ali'i imposed the Christian regulations, they
in effect ended the period of disorder following the death of the mo'i
Liholiho by establishing a new kapu system based on Christianity. In
doing so, they followed the traditional practice by which a new king
recreated the social order dissolved by his predecessor's death. But
the god was now Jehovah, Ka'ahumanu and her siblings were the
kings, and the society was governed by the tabus of Calvinist Chris-
tianity.63 "Seen, then, from the Hawaiian perspective, what the
Ka'ahumanu ma and the American clergy were doing was reinstating
59. See id. at 68.
60. See DAVID MALO, HAWAIIAN ANTIQUITIES (MOOLELEO HAWAII) 75 (Nathaniel B.
Emerson trans., Bishop Museum Press 1951) (1898).
61. See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 58, at 152-53. Moreover, when Ka'ahumanu, the regent,
successfully put down the 1824 rebellion in Kaua'i with the help of two ali'i and Christian
prayers, she decided this was the new source of mana she needed and became a devout
Christian.
62. See 1 MARSHALL SAHLINS & PATRICK KIRCH, ANAHULU: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
HISTORY IN THE KINGDOM OF HAWAII 68 (1992).
63. See id. at 69.
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the tabu (kapu) system. The word was explicitly adopted in this
context, and Christianity thus received as a Polynesian ritual
order-which in European terms would be a politico-religious
order. "'
During this first transition between 1825 and 1843, the chiefs and
king passed a series of laws. Some, such as harbor regulations and
marriage laws, were borrowed directly from European models, while
others, concerning the relationship between landlords (ali'i) and
cultivators of low rank (maka'ainana), conformed to the kapu system
already in place. The chiefs also passed a declaration of rights and a
constitution modeled after American and French prototypes. In 1838,
the ali'i hired the missionary William Richards to instruct them in new
forms of governance, since their earlier efforts to find a legally trained
person to help them acquire a European law code had been unsuc-
cessful. As early as 1824, when the mo'i Liholiho visited Britain, the
ali'i were anxious to acquire a European legal system.65 Between
1839 and 1842, Richards drafted a bill of rights, a constitution, and a
series of laws that combined Hawaiian and Anglo-American prin-
ciples, although he was not a trained lawyer. Significantly, these laws
were written first in Hawaiian, then translated into English, with the
Hawaiian version designated as binding.
The Constitution of 1840 begins with reference to the Christian
God:
It is our design to regulate our Kingdom according to the
above principles and thus seek the greatest prosperity, both of all
the chiefs and all the people of these Hawaiian Islands. But we
are aware that we cannot, ourselves alone, accomplish such an
object. God must be our aid, for it is His province alone to give
perfect protection and prosperity. Wherefore we first present our
supplication to Him that He will guide us to right measures and
sustain us in our work.
It is, therefore, our fixed decree,
I. That no law shall be enacted which is at variance with the
Word of the Lord Jehovah or at variance with the general spirit
of His Word. All laws of the Islands shall be in consistency with
the general spirit of God's law.'
This new legal system was consonant with many of the existing
cultural logics of the Hawaiian state. The ali'i ruled through power of
the Akua or gods, articulating their will to the people. The power to
64. Id. at 72.
65. See SAMUEL M. KAMAKAU, RULING CHIEFS OF HAWAII (1961).
66. HAW. CONST. OF 1840, in SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 14, 15 (William F. Swindler ed., 1974).
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rule depended on the ruler's state of pono, or righteousness: his or
her status of religious merit. Thus there was no division between legal
authority and religious authority; the one expressed the other, just as
they did within Protestant Christianity. The laws of this period began
with an invocation to Jehovah, the Christian deity, but incorporated
much of the existing legal relationship between ali'i and maka'ainana.
But despite the similarity in these systems of law, the missionaries'
law differed in important ways from the kapu system by which the
political structure of rank and distinction was maintained in Hawaiian
society in the 1820s. 7 For instance, under the new system, laws were
written rather than oral. In addition, executions were public affairs
carried out only after a public judicial procedure: a trial by jury.'
Generally speaking, the objective of the laws was the policing of
everyday morality and the creation of self-discipline rather than a
defense of the chiefly order of distinction and rank or the continuity
of the local community. Instead of marking difference and hierarchy,
as the chiefly system of kapu did, or guaranteeing a community order
of mutual respect and care, as the system of ordering within local
farming communities did,69 the new laws promoted the radically
different idea that the individual was responsible for fashioning his or
her self. Such self-fashioning was fundamental to Protestant Chris-
tianity. The practicing Christian was responsible for achieving not only
spiritual insight but also correct conduct, particularly with regard to
sexual behavior.
When the Hawaiian people appeared frustratingly slow to subject
themselves to the Protestant regime of self-governance and self-
entrepreneurship, missionaries turned to practices of exclusion and
punishment. Church members were suspended and expelled in large
numbers for violations that were often based on sexual conduct.
Those incapable of fashioning themselves through self-discipline were
expelled from the society of the saved and were punished in order to
induce moral reform through habituation. The use of criminal
sanctions and prisons to foster correct conduct became more
important. Observers in the 1840s described roads built smooth and
straight as arrows over vast ragged lava flows by convicted adulterers
using only hands and crowbars.7 ° Chiefs and courts imposed first
67. See ELLIS, supra note 55; IRVING GOLDMAN, ANCIENT POLYNESIAN SOCIETY (1970);
E.S. CRAIGHILL HANDY & MARY KAWENA PUKUI, THE POLYNESIAN FAMILY SYSTEM IN KA-
'U, HAWAII (Charles E. Tuttle 1972) (1958).
68. See Peter J. Nelligan & Harry V. Ball, Ethnic Juries in Hawaii: 1825-1900, 34 SOc.
PROCESS IN HAW. 113 (1992).
69. See HANDY & PUKUI, supra note 67; MALO, supra note 60.
70. See Henry T. Cheever, Letters from the South Seas (1842-1844) (2 Scrapbook of
Clippings from the New York Evangelist, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.).
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four, and then eight months hard labor as a penalty for adultery and
fornication.71 When particular chiefs no longer sought to enforce
these laws in their own domains, however, the laws languished,
leading to repeated demands by haoles (the Native Hawaiian term for
foreigners, later whites) for stricter enforcement of laws, improved
prison discipline, and separate quarters for male and female prisoners.
Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, Europeans complained about lax
prisons and the failure to enforce laws severely enough.
The missionaries hoped that the enactment of religious law on earth
would promote the transformation in social relationships they
envisaged, but quickly developed doubts about the chiefs' commit-
ment to enforcing these laws. In the hopeful years of the 1820s, they
imagined that this was a matter of time and habituation, but by the
1830s, it became clear that such a transformation in conduct was
eluding them. The Hawaiians readily went to church and adopted
Western dress of various forms, but were far less willing to take on
the new sexual practices that the missionaries advocated. Lists of
people suspended and excommunicated from membership in the
churches testified to the ongoing struggle.
B. The Second Transition
Between 1843 and 1852, a second transition took place. The
Christian/Hawaiian law was largely replaced by a secular New
England law. This system of law was based on law codes imported
from the United States with little inclusion of Hawaiian law. The
source of sovereignty was the will of the people, expressed in an
elected legislature, not the Akua or Jehovah. The architects of the
new system were New England lawyers who arrived in Hawai'i in the
1840s and were hired by the missionary advisors who in turn had been
hired by the Hawaiian king. One of them, William Little Lee, penned
the 1850 Penal Code, the basis for the criminal code of Hawai'i to this
day. He modeled this code closely after a proposed penal code for
Massachusetts developed in 1844.72 The cover page and table of
contents of the two law codes are parallel in layout and arrangement.
The categories of law in the Hawaiian code closely follow those of
Massachusetts. Lee introduces the Hawaiian text by saying that he has
adapted the customs of Massachusetts to the simpler mind of the
Hawaiian. Although he says in his introduction that he has tried to
conform to the principles of the ancient laws and usages of the
71. See, e.g., KAMAKAU, supra note 65.
72. See WILLARD PHILLIPS & SAMUEL B. WALcOTr, REPORT OF THE PENAL CODE OF
MASSACHUSETTS (1844).
20
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/16
Merry
Kingdom,73 this code incorporates very little Hawaiian law. Rather,
Lee relied primarily on the principles of the English common law as
the best basis for the future of the Kingdom. His statement on this
compromise is telling:
To prepare a system of laws equally well adapted to the native
and foreign portions of our community-one not too refined for
the limited mind of the former, and yet enough so to meet the
wants and capacity of the latter-it will be evident, is no easy
task. I have no confidence to believe that I have performed it
successfully. My chief aim has been to be so brief, simple, clear,
and direct, in thought and language, as not to confuse the native,
and yet so full as to satisfy his increasing wants, together with
those of the naturalized and unnaturalized foreigner.74
In striking contrast to the first codes, this one was written first in
English and then translated into Hawaiian.
The new laws produced a dramatic transformation in the social
organization of the islands that added to the disruption caused by
major economic and political transformations taking place at the same
time. One of the legal innovations was the introduction of fee-simple
land ownership in place of ali'i title and maka'ainana use rights under
the dispensation of chiefs. In the Great Mahele, or land division, of
1848, the land was divided up among the chiefs, and commoners were
allowed to petition for title to the lots they had lived on and
farmed.75 Few commoners received land in this allotment system,
while the simultaneous decision to allow foreigners to buy land led to
the extensive alienation of lands from both chiefs and commoners.
The authority of the ali'i over the people was substantially diminished
by laws that circumscribed the duties of the maka'ainana to the ali'i
as well as by the reallocation of land in the Mahele. At the same
time, the judicial authority of the ali'i over the maka'ainana living on
their lands was eliminated by the Third Organic Act of 1847, which
placed judicial power in the hands of an independent judiciary rather
than the ali'i.
71
Marriage became a permanent relationship in which women were
subordinated to the authority of their husbands. The doctrine of
coverture (1845) and the disenfranchisement of women (1850)
reinforced the authority of husbands over wives and eliminated
73. See PENAL CODE OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS at iv (1850).
74. Id.
75. See JON J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAWAII'S LAND DIVISION OF 1848 (1958);
KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 58; LINNEKIN, supra note 53.
76. See Third Organic Act: An Act to Organize the Judiciary Department of the Hawaiian
Islands, in STATUTE LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY KAMEHAMEHA III, KING OF THE HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS (Honolulu, Charles E. Hitchcock 1847).
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women from political participation.77 Marriage was redefined as
permanent; divorce became virtually impossible, and adultery was a
serious criminal offense.78 The requirement that taxes be paid in cash
rather than in kind and the elimination of the tax on labor propelled
subsistence farmers into the wage labor market.79 A master-servant
law, passed in 1850 and modeled on a New England prototype,
promoted use on the nascent sugar plantations of contract laborers
working under penal sanctions.
80
Thus, the second transition, the appropriation of Anglo-American
secular law, was far more radical in its redefinition of legal institutions
and law codes than was the first. Within the short space of five or six
years, enormous changes in statutory law transformed the legal system
of the Kingdom of Hawai'i into one similar to Western nations of the
mid-nineteenth century.
The effects on Hawaiian society were equally dramatic: reshaping
family relationships, replacing the ties of duty and aloha (love)
between ali'i and maka'ainana with the obligations of the market, and
separating the political and religious aspects of power. Ultimate
authority was redefined as resting in the people rather than the Akua.
Some of the everyday sexual practices of the maka'ainana were
redefined as criminal offenses, and the position of women shifted
from that of major political actors to wives in the circumscribed,
protected space of the Victorian home.
The second transition continued the logic of discipline and
punishment initiated by the first transition, which had differed sharply
from that of the kapu system of law. Instead of dramatic and violent
penalties imposed by the ali'i but moderated by the possibilities of
mercy in places of refuge (pu'uhonua), the new system focused on
reform and correction. Majesty and mercy were replaced by service
and habituation. A new system of judges, constables, and prisons
promoted this transformation, although complaints by haole judges
about lax prison discipline and the failure to segregate male and
female prisoners or even to require them to spend nights at the prison
continued in the 1840s and 1850s.81 The Hawaiian interpretation of
77. See Judith Gething, Christianity and Coverture: Impact on the Legal Status of Women in
Hawaii, 1820-1920, 11 HAW. J. HIST. 188 (1977).
78. Marriage practices before this change varied greatly according to rank, but generally had
allowed spouses to separate and remarry unless they were of high rank. Adultery was
discouraged, particularly for ranking individuals, but sexual contact between unmarried people
generally had been accepted.
79. See LINNEKIN, supra note 53.
80. An Act for the Government of Masters and Servants (1850), 1884 HAW. COMPILED
LAWS, ch. 30, at 453.
81. See Benjamin Pitman Letters (collection of Haw. State Archives, Honolulu, Haw.,
Interior Dep't Misc.).
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prison, with convicts doing service on the roads during the day and
returning home at night for food and shelter, was strikingly reminis-
cent of the system of labor tax that had been fundamental to chiefly
power in the kapu system but was sharply at odds with Calvinist
notions of repentance and character reform.
III. THE SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY
Why did the Hawaiians adopt a secular Anglo-American law in the
second transition? This was a choice made under considerable
pressure from foreign gunboats and obstreperous merchants residing
in Honolulu. The merchants had extended considerable credit to the
ali'i in exchange for sandalwood and then complained when the debts
were not repaid. Moreover, as the whale fishery developed, ships
brought thousands of desperate men to the shores of the islands in
search of drink, sex, and violence: men who required some form of
control by the Hawaiian state. France, Britain, and the United States
all contemplated annexation, as did their nationals resident on the
islands.82 A British naval commander did take control for six months
in 1843, reinforcing the fears of the ali'i that their sovereignty was in
jeopardy. The mo'i and ali'i were battered by demands of resident
foreigners for special privileges, as well as claims by European nations
that their subjects be tried only by juries of their countrymen and that
their products and their religious teachers be allowed access to the
Kingdom. The mo'i and ali'i turned increasingly to foreign advisors to
help them construct a government and legal system that would be
recognized by the leaders of European and American nation-states as
sovereign. This meant creating a nation that was viewed by European
and American powers as capable of governing itself and those
inhabiting its borders. Through these advisors, the apparatus of a state
and legal system understandable to Europeans was created.
The appropriation of Western law in the second transition
represented, then, an effort to construct a civilized nation in terms the
European colonial powers would recognize and respect. It furthered
the construction of the Kingdom of Hawai'i as a government under
the rule of law, one able to claim the status of "civilized" and
therefore sovereign. In the nineteenth-century Pacific, European
nations were rapidly claiming and annexing related peoples, stoking
the worries of the ali'i and mo'i. Thus, the second transition was an
endeavor to create a civilized state that would be recognized within
82. See generally GAVAN DAWS, SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
(1968); 1 RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1778-1854: FOUNDATION AND
TRANSFORMATION (1938) [hereinafter 1 KUYKENDALL, HAWAIIAN KINGDOM]; 2 RALPH S.
KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1854-1874: TWENTY CRITICAL YEARS (1953).
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the expanding imperial world. And, for forty years more, this strategy
preserved sovereignty in a world in which brown people were falling
increasingly under the control of white.
Ironically, although these institutions legitimated claims to
sovereignty in the nineteenth-century global order, they also deepened
dependence on foreigners to run them. As many observers noted, few
Hawaiians understood the intricacies and practices of European
mechanisms of government and law sufficiently, at least in the early
nineteenth century, to run them in ways the Europeans found
acceptable." In the face of overwhelming economic forces and
political fragility, the Hawaiian elites acquired a legal system that they
had to hire others to run.
The search for sovereignty in the nineteenth century depended on
the creation of a society that appeared "civilized" to those European
states whose recognition conferred sovereignty onto aspiring peoples.
A fundamental part of this construction of a civilized society was the
adoption of the rule of law, defined in European terms. Efforts to
transform the family and sexuality by prosecuting adultery in Hawai'i
reinforced efforts by the Hawaiian king and chiefs to mimic the forms
of "civilized" society. Only by becoming a "civilized" people could
they claim an autonomous space in the world of nations. Yet this
required alterations in manners of eating, covering the body, naming,
and engaging in sexual relations.84 As the Hawaiian ali'i sought to
claim "civilized" status, they demanded cultural changes from the
population, most notably a reshaping of the family and gender order.
The creation of a bourgeois form of marriage required the energetic
prosecution of adultery and fornication.
Paradoxically, Hawai'i was mocked by other nations when it
mimicked the ceremonial forms of European nationalism. One writer
labeled it a "pygmy kingdom,"85 while during his 1866 visit, Mark
Twain called it a place where the grown folk "play empire":
86
There is his royal Majesty the King, with a New York detec-
tive's income of thirty or thirty-five thousand dollars a year from
the "royal civil list" and the "royal domain." He lives in a two-
story frame "palace."
And there is the "royal family"-the customary hive of royal
brothers, sisters, cousins, and other noble drones and vagrants
usual to monarchy-all with a spoon in the national pap-dish, and
83. See generally KAMAKAU, supra note 65; 1 KUYKENDALL, HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, supra
note 82.
84. See generally ELIAS, supra note 22.
85. George H. Fitch, The Pygmy Kingdom of a Debauchee, 4 COSMOPOLITAN 123 (1888).
86. MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN IN HAWAII: ROUGHING IT IN THE SANDWICH ISLANDS
31 (Mutual Publ'g 1990) (1872).
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all bearing such titles as his or her Royal Highness the Prince or
Princess So-and-so. Few of them can carry their royal splendors
far enough to ride in carriages, however; they sport the
economical Kanaka horse or "hoof it" with the plebeians.s7
Twain lists a long series of officials, concluding: "Imagine all this
grandeur in a play-house 'kingdom' whose population falls absolutely
short of sixty-thousand souls!""8 After describing the elegant and
ornate gold-laced uniforms of the officials in a mocking way, he
remarks: "Behold what religion and civilization have wrought! '"8 9 The
Hawaiian effort to Christianize and civilize collided with the
European inability to recognize the likeness of their nationalism
among peoples of a darker hue. Twain's mockery encompasses the
pretensions of European nationalism as well as its derivative
enactment in Hawai'i.
IV. LEGAL APPROPRIATION AS RESISTANCE
The appropriation of an alien legal system in the search for
sovereignty can be interpreted as an act of resistance to the threat of
European takeover even though it appears to be a capitulation.
Concepts of hegemony and resistance have contributed significantly
to the redefinition of culture. Relations of power depend on systems
of meaning embodied in culture, while resistance to these hegemonic
cultural meanings takes the form of counterhegemonies or non-
compliant practices and discourses. Cultural practices can be either
hegemonic or resistant, but in either case they make up a field on
which power is traced and disrupted. Much of the recent literature on
resistance emphasizes its cultural character, its significance to consent
and legitimacy.9" Although earlier theories focused on articulated
and politically aware resistance, more recent work has expanded the
concept of resistance to include actions that do not involve a larger
vision of social injustice or change.91 The essential quality of resis-
tance is that it is oppositional: It moves against something else,
87. Id.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id. at 34.
90. See, e.g., ABu-LUGHOD, supra note 31; JEAN COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER; SPIRIT OF
RESISTANCE: CULTURE AND HISTORY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE (1985); COMAROFF &
COMAROFF, ETHNOGRAPHY, supra note 16; COMAROFF & COMAROFF, supra note 14;
CONTESTED STATES, supra note 13; ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., Int'l Publishers 1971);
SCOTT, DOMINATION, supra note 17; SCOTT, WEAPONS, supra note 17.
91. See, e.g., COMAROFF, supra note 90; COMAROFF & COMAROFF, supra note 14; SCOTT,
DOMINATION, supra note 17; SCOTT, WEAPONS, supra note 17; Ewick & Silbey, supra note 17;
Merry, supra note 17; Sarat, supra note 17; Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 40 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991).
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slowing down a moving entity. Phenomena identified as resistance
have a quality of the covert, the subtle, and the unspoken. Resistance
is noncooperation, often voiceless and inarticulate. It may or may not
be informed by a larger consciousness of injustice or by a vision of a
better social order. It is behavior that provides friction in the normal
operations of power. An essential ingredient of resistance is disrup-
tion, the creation of disorder within order.
Crime on the streets, graffiti, failure to pay income taxes, drunk
driving, work slowdowns by abused slaves, and labor union sabotage
in protest against unfair labor practices are all disruptions of power
but are not all forms of behavior generally considered resistance. This
list encompasses behavior typically viewed as heroic as well as that
which seems obstructionist, curmudgeonly, and self-serving. There is
clearly a normative judgment underlying the concept of resistance.
Forms of behavior identified as resistance are instances of non-
compliant actions by individuals or groups against systems of power
that the identifier considers unjust. The term has a celebratory
function, relabeling certain kinds of behavior commonly seen as dis-
reputable as heroism in the face of unjust oppression. The concept of
resistance contains an implicit judgment about justice. Without this
implicit criterion, it is difficult to construct an analytical definition of
resistance that can be applied in a variety of social contexts. En-
deavoring to construct a universal definition obscures the localism of
the judgment about what constitutes justice and injustice and the
importance of the positionality of the observer. Resistance is
inextricably tied to the way a just world is imagined at particular
historical moments by people in particular positions. Thus it is
difficult to work with any more general concept of resistance and
futile to construct a definition of what resistance really "is." Labeling
an action as resistance depends on the specificity of the situation, a
theory about just and unjust power relationships within that situation,
and a judgment by the observer in light of that theory.
Indeed, Antonio Gramsci clearly developed the concept in
conjunction with his own political interest in revolutionary change. He
emphasized the role of intellectuals who developed particular
strategies for furthering the class interests of workers by appealing to
a broad range of democratic and popular concerns. The organic
intellectuals within each class, those who had a political vision, would
lead the movement. 2 As Martha Kaplan and John D. Kelly note,
Gramsci viewed resistance as passive and unconscious, opposed to
92. See GRAMSCI, supra note 90, at 12. As Gramsci wrote, "The intellectuals are the
dominant groups' 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political
government." Id. at 12.
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agency. Resistance is the inarticulate, thing-like quality possessed by
those who do not understand the conditions of their subordination.93
It was the organic intellectual, the person fully conscious of his or her
situation, who could lead the subaltern from resistance to
revolutionary agency. Gramsci, however, also thought all men capable
of some moral reflection and believed that organic intellectuals are
produced by all social classes.94 Thus there seems no sharp division
between the politically conscious leader and the masses of the
population.95 Kaplan and Kelly suggest exploring the terrain opened
up by this expansion of the concept of resistance: that existing
between mere resistance and a superconscious revolutionary van-
guard. It is a political terrain of unconscious resistance, alienated
ideologies, and agents who challenge existing structures of domination
with different visions and who face different kinds of risks.96
But, even in this domain, the search for a universal definition is
futile. I think it is important to keep in mind the situated nature of
resistance and the notion that any label is imposed according to a
standard of justice held by the interpreter. Gramsci, for example, has
a clear political stance about social justice within which he deploys the
concept. But if one accepts that identifying acts as "resistant" depends
on the position of the observer and his or her conception of social
justice, focusing on these acts helps to reveal the contested and
unstable nature of culture. A focus on resistance provides a way of
undermining one-sided analyses of the imposition of law, the spread
of colonialism, or the expansion of capitalism. These were everywhere
contested processes, welcomed in some ways and resisted in other
ways.
Although some scholars see resistance in bipolar terms as a clash
between dominant and subordinate groups in which the cultural
worlds of both groups seem integrated and coherent, thus incor-
porating earlier notions of culture,97 resistance can take the form of
cultural appropriation as well. In his ethnographic study of Zaire, for
example, Filip de Boeck argues that local political leaders legitimated
their power through rituals that simultaneously drew on the symbolic
forms of the past and symbols of the paternalistic power of Mobuto
in the present.98 This is not understood as a contradictory practice
93. See Martha Kaplan & John D. Kelly, Rethinking Resistance: Dialogics of "Disaffection"
in Colonial Fiji, 21 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 123, 126 (1994).
94. See GRAMSCI, supra note 90.
95. See ROGER SIMON, GRAMSCI'S POLITICAL THOUGHT: AN INTRODUCTION (1991).
96. See Kaplan & Kelly, supra note 93.
97. See, e.g., SCOTT, DOMINATION, supra note 17; SCOTT, WEAPONS, supra note 17.
98. See Filip de Boeck, Postcolonialism, Power, and Identity: Local and Global Perspectives
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but as continuous with a process of cultural appropriation that has
long characterized this region of Zaire (now Congo): the creative
incorporation of external elements within an existing social and
cultural terrain.99 The incorporation provides a political space in the
modern state within which local political leaders can construct some
autonomy. Such local practices represent agentic appropriations under
conditions of contact and multiplicity.
Resistant appropriation occurs within political and economic
constraints. It means taking on board and adopting aspects of the
dominant system under duress. The Hawaiian chiefs who adopted the
Anglo-American legal system faced the periodic reappearance of
European gunboats threatening to flatten the harbor towns. This
pressure fueled their willingness to accept European notions of the
superiority of civilization and the rule of law. Rather than the
breakdown of a cohesive cultural system, this was a resistant
appropriation of those aspects of the dominant system that constituted
a cultural form more resistant to political conquest even as it
incorporated certain cultural practices and institutions of that
dominant system itself.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the concept of cultural appropriation provides a way of
understanding social transformation that is attentive to agency, to
competing cultural logics, and to the complexity of the social fields
within which changes take place. The concept defines culture as
contested, historically changing, and subject to redefinition in multiple
and overlapping social fields. It emphasizes continual transformations
in the meaning and structure of law rather than any notion that law
is embedded in a homogeneous and shared culture. It incorporates the
possibility of resistance, while recognizing that resistant practices
involve actions that appear to be accommodation and adaptation.
Changing the way culture is conceived makes it possible to
reimagine the relationship between law and culture. Processes of legal
transplantation, imposition, and borrowing, widespread during
nineteenth-century colonialism and contemporary globalization, are
central sites for examining this relationship. Appropriation can be a
resistant practice, even though it means adopting aspects of the
dominant society, since it restructures the position that the subor-
dinate occupies within the hegemonic structure created by dominant
societies. Contemporary movements by indigenous groups to define
themselves and their legal claims in terms of authentic tradition-the
99. See id. at 90.
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/16
1998] Merry 603
discourse of settler states such as the United States and
Canada-provide another example of this strategy.
This approach emphasizes the plurality of law and of culture: Law,
like culture, exists in social fields with multiple systems of meaning
and practice. Law can be theorized as consisting of local, regional,
national, and global systems of rules and procedures, each bearing
upon the ordering of local social relations in particular ways.
Resistance, collaboration, cooperation, and appropriation define the
shape of interactions between cultural practices and forms of legal
process.
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